Reconciliation benefits all

After two rounds of negotiations, Qatar's Emir Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani and Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz struck a deal to restore diplomatic relations in late September 2007.

Under the deal, Riyadh will send an envoy back to Doha by the end of the year, and Qatar-based satellite TV station Al-Jazeera will reopen an office in the Saudi Arabian capital.

It also keeps the planned Doha GCC summit on course for December.

With the air cleared, King Abdullah should feel willing to set foot on Qatari soil once more. Whether the 'agreement to agree' will continue beyond that is another matter.

Riyadh still has long-standing issues with the Al-Thanis, not just related to the outspoken Al-Jazeera. Saudi irritation with Qatar's highly individual foreign policy has accelerated in recent years, co-existing uneasily with Riyadh's steady promotion of a more active foreign policy of its own.

The pact might not have happened at all were it not for a natural disaster. The GCC summit was due to be held in Muscat, but the devastating cyclone that hit Oman in June prompted a switch to the Qatari capital.

Fate or not, both sides have something to gain from reopening channels, five years after Saudi anger over an Al-Jazeera broadcast attacking then Crown Prince Abdullah's Middle East peace initiative torpedoed the 2002 Doha

GCC summit.

Shaikh Hamad will certainly reap dividends from a reconciliation. Qatar's public relations-savvy diplomatic effort has raised the emirate's international profile. But the Al-Thanis know the limits of their influence. Faced with the threat of instability in Iraq and Iran, Doha sees little mileage in taking unnecessary pot-shots at Saudi shibboleths. The fact that it was Shaikh Hamad who went to the kingdom, rather than the other way around, indicates a renewed Qatari willingness to mend fences. King Abdullah's absence from yet another Doha summit would have dealt a severe blow to Qatar's diplomacy, and its pretensions to a supra-regional role.

But Riyadh too has much to gain from rapprochement. 'There is political will in both Riyadh and Doha in favour of reaching out and seeking out joint perceptions on important regional issues,' says Amr Hamzawy, senior associate at US thinktank Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 'Saudi Arabia is playing a more assertive regional role - for example, in Lebanon, on Palestine - and definitely needs the backing and support of its Gulf neighbours.'

Iraq is another challenge requiring the soothing balm of GCC diplomacy. GCC leaders are attempting to reach a political settlement acceptable to all Iraqi parties, made all the more urgent by the countdown to the withdrawal of US troops.

Qatar's offshore gas field shared with Iran is another cause of anxiety, given fears of Iranian regional ambitions. Kuwaiti and UAE crude exports would be affected by tensions around the Strait of Hormuz.

Improving bilateral ties with Qatar means Saudi Arabia will have more assets available to resolve regional conflicts, topped by the brewing Iranian crisis. The deal may also counter the erosion of Gulf unity on strategic economic issues, which has been deeply felt in Riyadh. Kuwait's exit from the Gulf currency union project, coming on top of the UAE, Qatar and Oman's bilateral free trade agreements with the US, has also undermined the six-nation alliance.

King Abdullah, having bedded in as king over the past two years, is also more confident of selling a deal to his domestic audience. His decision to seal a pact with his Qatari counterpart suggests a more emboldened Saudi ruler. In his days as de facto leader prior to King Fahd's death, he would have been less sure of getting backing from the House of Saud.

This is not the first time the two sides have attempted to patch up their dispute. Back in 2004, Saudi A