In early March, at the head of the funeral procession for Mahmood al-Jazeeri, a young Shia man killed a few weeks earlier after being hit in the head by a tear gas canister fired by police, a masked man chanted slogans against Bahrain’s ruling family.

“We demand the head of the king,” he shouted as the rest of the procession marching through the village of Nabih Saleh repeated the chant back to him.

“The biggest problem now is the political parties who are willing to sit at the same table as those who kill children,” he said later, still with a mask on and identifying himself only as a member of the group behind Bahrain’s protest movement that began on 14 February 2011.

Radicalisation threat

In the early days of unrest, the most radical calls by Shia protesters were for the removal of the Sunni prime minister, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa. Increasingly disenfranchised, young protesters who attended the funeral in the village of Nabi Saleh say they have little interest in the outcome of fresh talks between the government and opposition groups.

“The radicalisation on the streets is increasing in terms of rejecting any dealing with the government and demands for the overthrow of the regime,” says Jalil Khalil, a senior member of Al-Wefaq, the largest Shia political party in Bahrain.

For all the heated talk among Shia protesters, there are few conclusive signs that radicalisation stretches much beyond the rhetoric. Confrontations with police in the village of Al-Daih a few days later were broken up by security forces firing tear gas and shotguns, a relatively common occurrence now. So far though, protesters have yet to escalate their tactics beyond throwing Molotov cocktails or rocks.

The radicalisation on the streets is increasing in terms of rejecting any dealing with the government

Jalil Khalil, Al-Wefaq party

While the Shia villages continue in their seething discontent, renewed attempts at negotiating a political solution to the crisis are under way. In February, a coalition of opposition groups agreed to join talks with the government after King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa ordered Justice Minister Sheikh Khalid bin Ali al-Khalifa to bring together members of the societies.

At present, the talks are the best hope of restoring stability, but no one is letting their expectations get too high yet. After nine meetings, there are still fundamental differences about how to progress with the talks.

The opposition bloc, which includes Al-Wefaq, wants the royal family to be represented in the talks and any recommendations to be voted on in a national referendum.

Neither of those is likely to happen. A statement issued by Royal Court Minister Khalid bin Ahmed in early March said “no party represents the king”. It added that any outcome from the talks would be taken to the king to “implement them through the existing constitutional establishments.”

For the opposition, this was read as a refusal of their two main conditions. Talks are continuing, but both sides are not convinced about the other’s conviction.

For Manama, the renewed push for dialogue seems to be mainly the result of regional and international pressure. Riyadh, in particular, is pushing for a solution to the political crisis, fearing that the longer the uprising goes on, the greater the potential for it to stir up trouble in its own Shia community and elsewhere in the region. Abu Dhabi is also understood to be eager to see the situation in Bahrain stabilised.

“There is a growing consensus in the GCC countries that Bahrain is taking too long to resolve this situation,” says one Western diplomatic source. “Saudi Arabia is definitely amenable for a solution here, but the prime minister has to stay. That is a red line.”

Riyadh is thought to be particularly worried about any compromises that could appear as a victory for the protest movement. Allowing demonstrators to claim such a senior scalp would embolden activists elsewhere in the region, they fear.

Saudi support

Previously, Saudi Arabia’s response to the situation in Bahrain has been to provide troops to help quash the protests and force demonstrators out of the capital. That policy was led by Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saud. Since his death in 2012, along with that of several other significant political figures, a more moderate Riyadh has emerged. Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saud (son of the former crown prince) and King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud are thought to favour a deal to restore stability as long as its “red lines” are not crossed.

“Prince Mohammed bin Nayef is pushing for this and so is King Abdullah’s royal court,” says one Bahraini political source involved in the dialogue. “The international and regional community have been exerting pressure to start this dialogue.”

The appointment of Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa as first deputy prime minister in March is also expected to bolster the prospects for the dialogue. Sources close to the crown prince say he remains committed to pushing reform and compromise with the opposition.

“What happened in Bahrain has not united the people against the government, it has divided them,” says one senior figure in the crown prince’s circle.

“This is why we feel angry about what has happened as it has not helped the people of Bahrain, it has hurt them.”

Internal reforms

At the peak of the protests in 2011, Prince Salman led a failed attempt at negotiating a political deal with opposition groups, which damaged his reputation among Sunni hardliners and weakened his political standing.

In his new position, the crown prince has an executive role within the government which should allow him to push reform from inside the government for the first time. Previously, he had tried to push through reform from outside the executive, creating an almost parallel cabinet as part of the Economic Development Board, to hold ministries accountable and help set their objectives.

Opposition groups have welcomed the crown prince’s appointment as a sign that the regime may be more serious about the dialogue and implementing reform than they previously thought.

They say previous initiatives like the recommendations from an independent report by a former UN war crimes investigator have failed to be properly implemented. “We consider this step a good opportunity to start the change,” says Al-Wefaq’s Khalil. “It creates a healthier environment to support the dialogue.”

Despite this, they remain concerned about how much hardliners within the Al-Khalifa family will block the dialogue. “There is so much in-fighting in the [Al-Khalifa] family that it is not allowing Bahrain to progress,” says another member of Al-Wefaq.

Observers say there are perhaps as many as four camps within Bahrain’s royal family now. The crown prince represents the most liberal-minded end of the spectrum and is the most willing to broker a political settlement. King Hamad has shown recognition that Bahrain needs reform, but is described by diplomats as lacking the strategic vision of his son, the crown prince.

Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman is a hated figure among most of the Shia, and is often considered the leader of the hardliners. In truth, another faction known as the Khawalid are the least interested in compromise and present the biggest roadblock to dialogue efforts.

The Khawalid include Sheikh Khalid and his full brother, defence minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Ahmed. This branch of the family now holds sway over the security and intelligence agencies, the king’s royal court and the Justice Ministry.

The opposition bloc says that with this in mind they do not yet hold much hope of the dialogue making meaningful progress, and have so far been reluctant to send in their most senior figures.

“We are going into this with our eyes open,” says Khalil. “But if they show that they are serious about this, then we will show that we are very serious.” After almost two months of talks, little meaningful progress has been made, say insiders.

A big unknown is also the ability of opposition political parties to deliver popular support for whatever the outcome of the talks is. To a lesser degree, it could also be an issue for the government to garner support in the Sunni community, depending on what compromises are eventually agreed.

“Even if Al-Wefaq does a deal with the government, we will still stay on the streets,” says one demonstrator in the Nabih Saleh funeral procession.

“The concern with the dialogue is that opposition groups such as Al-Wefaq or Waad [National Democratic Action Society] are losing support on the street, or probably never had it,” says one source in the Al-Khalifa family. “There are a lot of extremists in all the different camps in Bahrain.”

Under pressure

Previous attempts at holding a dialogue have failed because the opposition held out for more concessions when the crown prince was leading the talks in March 2011, or because they doubted the government’s commitment and walked out of a national dialogue in mid-2011.

Eager to avoid being painted as the stumbling block this time, the opposition is sticking with the talks for now. Pressure from the likes of Saudi Arabia is also keeping the government at the table. While not ideal conditions for constructive dialogue, pressure on both sides may help to keep things going long enough for a consensus to start to emerge. If this coincides with a rise in the influence of the crown prince, it may be enough to secure a deal that ends the political deadlock.

If talks collapse again, it will further fuel radicalisation among Shias. “Without a political solution, the situation could go out of control, for us and the regime,” says Khalil.