The storm of comment about Saudi Arabia since it announced the execution of 47 Saudi Arabians convicted of terrorism has been mainly negative.

It provided an opportunity for some to forecast political problems to compound the economic challenges created by slumping oil prices.

Such predictions have been voiced before, and these will probably be wrong again, as well.

Saudi Arabia, the world’s leading oil exporter, has the Middle East’s largest economy. It grew by 140 per cent in the decade ending 2014. The kingdom has almost no debt and more than $600bn in savings. Inflation is low, the banking system is sound and Saudi companies are among the region’s most successful.

Life expectancy, literacy and living standards are high by regional standards.

The kingdom’s guardianship of Islam’s holy places is admired. It is a stabilising force in the region and plays a constructive role in key transnational institutions, including the G20.

And it has the capacity to project military power, if it chooses, well beyond its frontiers.

So why the panic about Saudi Arabia’s prospects?

There are three main reasons.

The first is the oil price slump, but this is due to – not despite – Saudi oil policy. Recognising the impact of growing US and non-Opec production, soaring Iraqi output and the imminent return of Iranian oil to world markets, the kingdom decided to defend its market share. The price war probably will not end for at least a year, but the kingdom can use its savings, borrow and privatise to make up for the revenue shortfall. It is playing to win and has the resources to do so.

The second is the end of nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. The Islamic Republic has 80 million people, the world’s biggest gas reserves and a diversified economy. It deserves to recover its regional and global position.

But Iran is also a revolutionary state seeking to export its interpretation of Islam and radicalise disaffected minorities in neighbouring states.

The kingdom may be overstating the Iranian threat, but its doubts are comprehensible. Iran confirmed them by allowing a mob to storm its Tehran embassy.

Third is America’s shift in attitude to Iran. The kingdom once knew where it stood with Washington, but it has not been so sure since President Obama was elected in 2008. Today, Riyadh is convinced Washington has decided to partner with Iran at Saudi Arabia’s expense. It is not surprising the kingdom objects.

Oil, Iran’s return and Washington’s new Middle East posture are obliging the kingdom to make contentious decisions within Opec, about Syria and Iran, and towards the US. They may not stand the test of time, but they are not a sign of weakness or a loss of direction.

The commentators are, however, not the audience Riyadh is addressing. It is the Saudi Arabian people who matter most. There is no evidence among the majority of opposition to standing up to Iran, Washington and wreckers of domestic harmony. And so long as that is the case, all the words in the world signify nothing.