The ethnic and religious melting pot that is the Kirkuk province has become the key battleground of the conflict in northern Iraq as Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Isis) forces fight for influence in the oil-rich area.

The KRG, which regards Kirkuk as part of the Kurdish ancestral homeland, seized control of Kirkuk city and the surrounding oil fields in July 2014, as Iraq’s federal security forces retreated in the wake of Isis’ advance.

Isis is estimated to control about 45 per cent of the province including the Sunni-majority district of Hawija, located 50 kilometres west of the city, which the group uses as a base for military operations.

Prized possession

The visit of KRG President Massoud Barzani to Kirkuk city on 17 February – the first since Kurdish forces repelled a major attack by Isis in late January – reinforced the importance of the province to the regional government, which has legal autonomy over the northern Iraqi provinces of Dohuk, Erbil and Suleimaniyah.

“Kirkuk is as important to the enemy as it is to us,” said Barzani on his visit to Kirkuk, Kurdish news agency Rudaw reported. “It is important to them, in terms of morale and politically, if they manage to take Kirkuk. We will keep Kirkuk even if we have to withdraw forces from other areas.”

The area’s rich oil and gas resources make its long-term sovereignty even more contentious, with Kirkuk’s fields making up as much as 20 per cent of national exports in recent years. 

The Iraqi constitution of October 2005 calls for a referendum allowing the people of Kirkuk to choose whether the Kurdish areas of the province are governed by Baghdad or Erbil. But the vote never materialised and fell down the KRG’s priority list as the regional government mobilised its forces against Isis.

The Shia militias are saying they will take a hard stance (once the [Isis] crisis is over) against the Peshmerga

Mustafa Alani, Gulf Research Centre

“Kirkuk is as significant symbolically as it is strategically. It is a microcosm of Iraq as a whole,” says Samuel Morris, research fellow at the Erbil-based Middle East Research Institute (Meri). “As Isis has been pushed north, out of the Diyala province, Kirkuk has become a focal point for violence.”

Recent fighting saw Kurdish Peshmerga forces retake the Khabbaz field’s oil assets – located 20km southwest of the city – after they were seized by Isis in an offensive against the Kurds on 31 January.

A video released by Isis in late February showed 21 captives presented as Peshmerga soldiers, Iraqi army officers and Kirkuk policemen being paraded through streets in cages. According to reports, the video was shot a week earlier in the centre of Hawija. 

Kirkuk is now sandwiched between KRG provinces to the north and east, the Isis-controlled Sunni cities of Mosul and Tikrit in the west and south, and the increasing presence of federal Iraqi forces and Shia militia in the area. 

Data on the ethnic and religious make-up of Kirkuk province varies widely. Historically, the region has had a large Kurdish population, but Saddam Hussein’s ‘Arabisation’ programme expelled many Kurds and Turkmen, replacing them with Arabs from the south.

Following the US-led invasion in 2003, many displaced people returned to reclaim their former property. Kirkuk is now largely a mix of Kurds, Turkmen and Arabs, with the latter estimated to be in a minority.

There are currently no Peshmerga mobilised in Kirkuk city itself, which is being policed by the Kurdish Asayish security force and the federal police.

Shia support

Hadi al-Ameri, head of the Iran-backed Shia militia group Badr Brigade, visited Kirkuk a week before Barzani and proposed coordinating with the Peshmerga to help drive Isis out of the region.

Shia Al-Hashd al-Shabi popular mobilisation units are thought to be present in the village of Bashir, southwest of Kirkuk city. However, Barzani announced during his visit that no military groups would be allowed into Kirkuk except for the Peshmerga.

The use of irregular Shia forces in the fight against Isis has been controversial, especially given that Shia dominance in post-2003 Iraqi politics fuelled the resentment that allowed Isis to gain popularity among Sunni communities.

In January, Sunni politicians and tribal leaders accused Shia fighters of killing at least 70 unarmed civilians fleeing the conflict while regular Iraqi forces watched. These reports undermine Baghdad’s efforts to try and turn Sunni-majority areas away from Isis support.

Barzani has made it clear he will not tolerate increased militia presence in Kirkuk and feels the KRG’s presence in the province is legitimised by the abandonment by Iraqi government forces.

Critics of the Kurds in Baghdad argue that Kirkuk city was never under threat from Isis and the KRG’s move into the city was merely opportunistic. While Kirkuk is strategically significant in the conflict, its role as a major oil producer makes the province’s long-term political status a source of national importance.

At the time of Isis’ incursion into northern Iraq in June 2014, exports of oil from the Kirkuk fields had been offline since March due to an attack on the main pipeline to the Turkish border.

Disputes over federal budget payments had also led to heightened tensions between the Erbil and Baghdad governments, leading to the KRG controversially exporting crude independently through its own pipeline to the port of Ceyhan in Turkey. But a landmark agreement between the two governments in November 2014 led to the restart of exports from Kirkuk via the Kurdish pipeline.

The KRG is allowed to export 250,000 barrels a day (b/d) of oil from its own assets and 300,000 b/d from the Kirkuk field in return for its 17 per cent share of the national budget. 

However, the fall in oil prices in the second half of 2014 and the ongoing conflict have left both governments facing economic crises that could scupper their ability to meet commitments.

“Theoretically, a drop in oil prices should not have affected Baghdad’s ability to pay the Kurds – it would have just meant the KRG would receive 17 per cent of a smaller pie,” says Morris. “However, Baghdad has a severe liquidity problem, which means they are unable to pay the Kurds the full 17 per cent as per their agreement.”

Erbil’s Natural Resources Minister Ashti Hawrami has stated that any oil income above the agreed 550,000 b/d would be paid to the international oil companies (IOCs) operating in KRG territory, which are owed significant arrears. This indicates that Erbil still plans to sell crude independently regardless of its agreement with Baghdad.

In early November, the KRG announced its independent exports had hit 300,000 b/d and it expected to expand sales to 500,000 b/d during the first half of 2015. The figures do not include the capacity of the oil fields seized in Kirkuk, which is estimated at more than 400,000 b/d.

Kirkuk assets

The Baghdad-Erbil oil deal was a short-term measure to restart exports of crude pumped from the Kirkuk field, but does little to address the future status of the province’s oil assets.

Some analysts warn that Barzani’s resolve to hang on to Kirkuk, regardless of the continued threat from Isis, puts the KRG on an inevitable collision course with Baghdad and Iran-backed Shia militia groups.

The future of Kirkuk could become a priority after Baghdad’s planned assault on Mosul, the country’s third-biggest city, which was seized by Isis in June 2014.

Washington has made no secret of backing Baghdad in preparations for a major ground assault against Mosul, declaring that an Iraqi force of more than 20,000 troops is being trained for an offensive in April or May.

Mustafa Alani, senior adviser and programme director of security and terrorism studies at the Geneva-headquartered Gulf Research Centre, is not hopeful that the issue of control over Kirkuk can be resolved peacefully.

“If the Iraqi army liberates Mosul, it will put huge pressure on the KRG and the Peshmerga,” he says. “This is going to be the turning point. I think the next conflict absolutely will turn on this disputed area [of Kirkuk].

“The Shia militias are saying clearly that they will take a hard stance (once the [Isis] crisis is over) against the Peshmerga and how they behaved in taking advantage of the situation to occupy Kirkuk.”

Baghdad and Erbil appear to be prioritising dealing with the threat of Isis over the coming months but, if the security situation improves,  neither side will be able to avoid the elephant in the room.