When official delegations, bankers and business executives gather in Sharm el-Sheikh in March 2015 for an international conference to promote Egypt’s investment prospects, they are likely to be greeted with images celebrating the stability and national unity that have been fostered by President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi.

As far as government officials are concerned, [repression is] the price that must be paid for confronting terrorism

In the view of Al-Sisi’s supporters, his decision as army commander to remove Mohamed Mursi from power in July 2013 was a necessary step to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from driving the country to ruin, and has provided stable foundations on which to build Egypt’s future.

According to a survey taken in early 2014 by US think-tank Pew Research, that view was broadly shared by the majority of Egyptians. However, there is also a wide spectrum of dissent, ranging from upholders of civil liberties to extreme jihadists.

Heavy suppression

Whatever stability Al-Sisi has brought has come with a heavy dose of repression. As far as government officials are concerned, this has been the price that must be paid for confronting terrorism.

Sameh Shoukri, the foreign minister, told a business gathering held in London in October that Egypt was a bastion protecting Europe from a wave of terrorism. He argued that there was a direct line from the ideology of the Brotherhood to the extreme violence of the jihadist group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Isis). Such statements leave little room for Western officials to plead for a more measured approach, balancing political freedoms and civil liberties against security concerns, particularly now that the US and some European states have embarked on their own military campaign to check the advance of Isis in Iraq and Syria.

The real or perceived enemies of the Al-Sisi state make a long list. The largest body of dissenters is the Brotherhood, but its scope for effective political action has been limited by the harshness of the security measures against it – more than a thousand of its supporters were killed in July and August 2013, and since then tens of thousands have been detained.

Being in the front line against Islamist extremism has helped [Al-Sisi] deflect Western criticism… of his regime

The passage of a law in late 2013 that severely restricts the right to protest has brought most of the groups that were active in the uprising against former president Hosni Mubarak’s regime into the authorities’ line of fire, and dozens of leading civil society activists have been arrested. Even Tamarod, the movement that launched the mass petition against Mursi in early 2013, has now turned against the Al-Sisi regime.

However, recent protests such as the 28 November Islamist rallies and the demonstrations against the acquittal of Mubarak in early December were relatively sparsely attended, reflecting widespread resignation at the ascendancy of the security state.

The government has taken every opportunity to conflate popular protest with terrorism. A recent example was the decision taken in late October to extend the powers of military tribunals in the wake of an assault by Islamist fighters on army positions in North Sinai, in which more than 30 troops were killed.

The new constitution, passed in early 2014, had stated that civilians may only be tried in military tribunals if they are implicated in direct attacks on military installations. Following the 24 October Sinai incident, Al-Sisi issued a decree stating that all public institutions and infrastructure will be defined as military zones for a period of two years, which means attacks on such targets would be considered as crimes directed against the armed forces, and the perpetrators can be referred to military courts.

Security zone

The government followed this by carving out a security zone along Egypt’s border with Rafah, at the southern end of the Palestinian Gaza Strip. More than 1,000 families have been displaced to make way for this buffer zone, which is 500 metres deep and stretches for 14 kilometres.

The government says the buffer zone is needed to prevent fighters of the Islamist Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM) militant group from using Gaza as a logistical and operational base. ABM has since declared its allegiance to Isis and describes its area of operations as ‘Wilayat Sinai’ (State of Sinai).

Al-Sisi’s commitment to a tough military response to the threat of Islamist extremists in Sinai, as well as in eastern Libya, has put Egypt at the heart of the regional alliance against Isis and most other forms of political Islam.

The leading players in this alliance are the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which have shown their appreciation of Al-Sisi’s role through providing vital financial support. Being in the front line against Islamist extremism has also helped the leader deflect Western criticism of the authoritarian aspects of his regime.

Al-Sisi now faces the challenge of building up the institutional legitimacy of his rule. The roadmap he announced after ousting Mursi envisaged a political transition being completed in nine months to a year, entailing the passage of a new constitution, the election of a parliament and the election of a president.

In the final phase of drafting the constitution, the order of the elections was switched, which has allowed Al-Sisi to rule by decree for the past six months. The constitution requires all of these decrees to be reviewed by the new legislature within 15 days of its inauguration. Given the likelihood that the new parliament will be dominated by a solid Al-Sisi-loyal bloc, the review of the decrees should be a formality.

The parliamentary election has faced lengthy delays, even though the basic electoral law had been passed by the interim president, Adly Mansour, shortly before Al-Sisi assumed office. The one-chamber parliament will have 567 seats, of which 420 will be individual candidates elected in specific constituencies, 120 will be from candidate lists (drawn up by parties or individuals) and 27 will be appointed by the president. This division of seats will greatly favour local interests in a position to dispense state patronage, and will marginalise political parties.

Fair representation

The delay has arisen over the constitutional requirement for there to be a fair representation of the population and of the various governorates in the House of Representatives. The existing electoral districts do not meet these criteria, with the number of registered voters in different constituencies ranging from the low tens of thousands to several hundred thousands.

The issue has been complicated by the decision to create three new governorates, bringing the total to 30. The new governorates are El-Alamein (west of Alexandria), El-Wahat (in the Western Desert) and Middle Sinai. The government has said repeatedly over the past few months that it is on the point of passing the new electoral districts law.

In early December, the Electoral Districts Committee finalised the draft of the law, and on 10 December, the cabinet approved the legislation, according to state media. The official government line is that the elections will take place in the first quarter of 2015.

The task of forging a pro-Al-Sisi parliamentary bloc is proving to be more complicated than the president might have hoped.

Several veteran political figures have come forward with plans to set up blocs for the 120 seats reserved for candidate lists. They include Amr Moussa, a former foreign minister and Arab League head who was in charge of the drafting committee for the 2014 constitution, and Kamal el-Ganzouri, a former prime minister who was sidelined by Mubarak and has re-emerged into active political life since 2011. Mourad Mawafi, a former colleague of Al-Sisi in military intelligence, has also sought to develop a political following with a view to securing a bloc of seats in the new parliament.

None of these efforts has had much success, and it is unlikely these ageing establishment figures will be able to inspire any sort of enthusiastic following in the election. Figures such as Ziad Bahaa el-Din of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, and Hala Shukrallah, leader of the Dostour Party, represent a moderately critical opposition trend, but this is likely to constitute only a small minority in the new parliament. There is likely to be only a token Islamist representation in the house, mainly comprising members of the Nour Party, a Salafist group. Turnout will be low.

The election is unlikely to bring about any substantial changes to the government or its main policies. The constitution bars MPs from serving in the cabinet, and there is little chance of the new parliament going against Al-Sisi’s wishes as it performs its functions of scrutinising and passing legislation, and expressing confidence in the government.