Iraq’s provincial elections, held this year, provide an early guide as to how the 2014 parliamentary polls may pan out.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition won majorities in nine out of 13 provinces. The Shia-led party took more than 1.7 million votes out of just over 7 million and maintained control of the holy city of Karbala and other areas in central Iraq. The elections earned the party 109 seats out of 444, compared to the Citizen’s Alliance with 61 and the Moqtadr al-Sadr-led Liberal Coalition with 44 seats, according to the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC).

Al-Maliki losses

What appears to be success for the prime minister must be put in context, however. His party unsurprisingly lost out in the Sunni-dominated Anbar and Ninevah provinces, where polls had been delayed following protests in March that Al-Maliki put down with force, as well as in Salahuddin.

More importantly, the party lost out in Najaf and Missan in the southeast of Iraq, where Shias account for more than 90 per cent of the population. In Missan, the Liberal Coalition won 90,000 votes against Al-Maliki’s 77,000. In Najaf, the loss was even greater: the State of Law Party won only 76,000 votes, compared with 118,000 for the Loyalty to Najaf party out of a total of 413,000 voters. This suggests local issues such as poor services were more important than national ideological issues.

Al-Maliki’s support in the capital has dwindled, as well as in the key oil producing regions of Basra and Wasit

The election results were certainly different to those of the previous provincial vote held in 2009, landing a major blow to the State of Law party, which had gained control of huge swathes of southern Iraq and Baghdad. Even in provinces where the party was successful, it faced tough competition. Al-Maliki’s support in the capital has dwindled, as well as in the key oil producing regions of Basra and Wasit. Basra’s new governor, elected on 12 June, is Majid al-Nasirawi of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).

Part of the challenge to Al-Maliki’s dominance has come from the ISCI and Sadrists, two rival Shia parties that were previously allied to the prime minister. Despite having brought other Shia parties under its umbrella, the State of Law Coalition received just 34 per cent of Shia seats – much less than in previous polls.

Al-Maliki has also faced a challenge from smaller parties in the provinces where Sunnis are in a majority. Votes were split along regional, tribal and ideological lines. Protests have spread across Sunni Arab provinces since December last year, following the arrest of Rafee Issawi, the Sunni former finance minister, and a number of his body guards, accusing them of corruption and terrorism.

The Sunni protest movement has evolved from calls for greater inclusion in governance and the repeal of the de-Baathification laws, to fully-fledged demands for autonomy. Only then, Sunnis believe, will they have equal rights. This solution, however, leaves out Sunnis living as minorities in other provinces, such as Baghdad, where they will face greater marginalisation.

Sectarianism will remain a key influence in the 2014 elections, but Sunni leaders such as parliamentary speaker Osama Nujaifi, who leads the Mutahidun party, will need to maintain their relations with the Sadrists and other Shia parties in order to oust Al-Maliki, should he choose to run for a third term.

Many hope that focusing the election on the government’s poor record in providing basic services for Iraqis could help ease the current sectarian tension, which is seen as the cause of increasing violence in 2013. However, this would take a major shift in the mindset of the country’s political elite. Regional dynamics, in particular the ongoing civil war in Syria, will also play a role in keeping the focus on sectarian divisions between Iraq’s Sunnis and Shias.

A report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG), published in mid-August, sums up the challenge: “With the 2014 parliamentary elections on the horizon, the prime minister and the political class as a whole seem inclined to invest in identity politics as a way of shoring up their rank and file, suggesting a continuation of the same toxic dynamics in the months to come.”

Negotiating ceasefires

Al-Maliki’s approach of subduing unrest through the deployment of troops and using special forces to arrest political leaders and intimidate whole swathes of the population is unlikely to yield the results he is looking for. A better starting point, according to the ICG, is to engage with the new provincial councils to negotiate ceasefires.

“This would entail restraint on the part of government security forces that have been prone to escalation,” says the report, but the return would be a more cooperative attitude from local officials. Efforts will also be needed to restore the confidence of disillusioned Sunnis.

It remains to be seen whether the State of Law party will be able to turn the results around by the time of next year’s election. Notwithstanding the coalition’s fate, going by the long delays seen following the March 2010 poll, there is likely to be a major impact on government decision-making and spending.

That election did not yield a clear winner, with Al-Maliki and former prime minister Iyad Allawi almost tied. It took more than 10 months after that for Al-Maliki to form a coalition government, during which project spending ground to a halt. The 2014 poll could suffer a similar fate with a similar knock-on effect on tenders and awards for infrastructure that Iraq requires to get its reconstruction going.

During his two terms, Al-Maliki has gone to considerable lengths to consolidate the levers of power in Iraq, assuming control of the ministries of interior and defence, and targeting political opponents. Many have dubbed him a new dictator and attempts have been made to remove him from power. In June 2012, a political crisis unfolded in Baghdad as a coalition of parties tried to unseat Al-Maliki through a parliamentary no-confidence vote.

Relinquishing power

The truest test of these claims of authoritarianism will be whether Al-Maliki is willing to let go of power at the end of his second term. The clearest sign of his desire to remain in the prime minister’s office came on 25 August, when the Supreme Court struck down a law passed in parliament earlier in the year that had attempted to block his third term. It is unclear what argument was used in the court. Al-Maliki’s supporters claim that according to the constitution, there are no explicit term limits on the premiership.  

“There is still a chance that Al-Maliki will run for a third term, although this will depend on whether the State of Law party or the National Alliance nominate him,” says an Iraqi commentator, who recently fled the country following a kidnapping attempt, a stark reminder of its increasingly fragile security climate. “But this time he may face competition within the National Alliance. He will never win the support of the Kingmakers [the Kurds] without getting rid of Hussain al-Shahristani [Iraq’s current deputy prime minister for energy affairs], even though the latter is his key partner in the State of Law party. Hence, the recent bickering between the two on lack of electricity services.”

The support of Iraq’s Kurds will be critical for the prime minister either way. They have so far refused to join a Sadrist-led coalition against him and his relationship with Kurdish president, Nechirvan Barzani, appears to be improving. Al-Shahristani, however, remains a bugbear due to his disregard for Kurdish oil deals and Iraq’s woeful performance in the provision of electricity.