Something curious is happening across Morocco. Until recently, its surprisingly prolific press largely limited their front pages to coverage of Morocco’s monarch, King Mohamed VI. Now, for every full-page cover on the king, another details the achievements or failures of Morocco’s new prime minister, Abdelilah Benkirane of the moderately Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD).

Benkirane became the head of the coalition government in November 2011 after the PJD gained the most votes in an election, which brought to a close a turbulent year for Morocco. His job since then has been to implement changes to the constitution, stabilise the economy and try to fulfill PJD’s election promises to fight corruption and to improve the lot of the country’s poor and unemployed.

Local media coverage of the prime minister’s work ranges from the critical to the ecstatic. It is symbolic of one of the freest presses in the region, but also of the division of opinion among Moroccans over the events of 2011 and the direction in the country is headed.

Coalition politics in Morocco

To some, the PJD, and Benkirane in particular, have been fooled into acting as a buffer between the royal court of the king and the people who demanded change, accountable governance and social justice in 2011. Others believe that the PJD is well-meaning, but say that it will be hamstrung by either vested interests or a lack of executive experience for the duration of its term in government.

The new coalition government is made up of the PJD and Morocco’s traditional parties of government: the pro-monarchy, economically liberal Popular Movement; the more conservative Istiqlal (Independence); and the leftwing Progress and Socialism Party. It has inherited a litany of problems.

The task of accelerating economic growth has been made harder by the financial crisis in Europe, high unemployment and the fragility of Morocco’s public finances. Promises made by outgoing prime minister Abbas el-Fasi of Istiqlal to increase public sector employment and wages did little to help, given a widespread recognition that the existing number of government jobs needed to be cut.

Of course, expectations have been high. When you have a revolution, it leaves a lot of people disappointed

Lachen Haddad, Tourism Minister

In its favour, the Benkirane administration has more power to act independently than any of its predecessors. Under constitutional reforms announced by King Mohamed VI in June 2011 and voted into law by a national referendum a month later, the prime minister became head of government for the first time and acquired the power to dissolve parliament and make about 1,000 political appointments directly. The king reserved the right to appoint only 37 officials, although these include key posts such as regional governors and the head of the military.

But the new government has so far made few changes to the economic policies of previous administrations, say western diplomats and analysts based in the capital. Some PJD supporters had hoped to see Benkirane adopt a more combative tone in his new position, but party officials are at pains to explain that he is the “king’s prime minister” first and foremost. There is no question as to who is boss.

“During the past nine months, there has been a dynamic of gradual economic, social and political reforms,” says Mustapha Khalfi, a PJD MP and since November communications minister and the government’s official spokesman. “This is happening during what we call the third path between a revolution, like what happened in Tunisia and Egypt, and the system of control and ignorance of democracy, that led to the Arab Uprisings. Morocco is between these two ways. Our way is the third path: reforming within stability.”

Initial economic reforms

Economic reforms that have been implemented have largely focused on improving the welfare of Morocco’s poor. With the savings it hopes to make from cutting the cost of running the government and funds diverted from other spending programmes, the Benkirane administration has introduced free healthcare services for 8.5 million people.

This includes the 4 million people the World Bank classifies as living in absolute poverty in Morocco, at a total cost of MD5bn ($565m). The PJD has also announced a scheme similar to Brazil’s Bolsa Familiar, which gives small cash payments to the neediest families. Part of the cost of the project, a government minister says, will be covered by reform of fuel subsidies.

Fuel subsidies, which accounted for 20 per cent of government spending and 6 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011, are being cut. The price of gasoline and diesel have increased by up to 20 per cent at the pump. Both of these programmes should help to quell unrest among the country’s poor.

The PJD is not radical – they are real monarchists. They are quite naive in economic and strategic matters

Fouad Abdelmoummi, economist

Not that subsidy reduction was not a necessity anyway. Morocco has been eroding its foreign currency reserves in recent years. According to the Washington-headquartered IMF, with oil prices above $100 a barrel in 2011 and 2012, overall foreign currency holdings fell from $22.5bn in April 2011 to $15.8bn in May 2012. The near 30 per cent drop left the kingdom with just enough cash in the system to cover four months’ imports. In August, the IMF stepped in and extended a $6.2bn credit line to the Moroccan government to help it maintain macroeconomic stability.

Rabat is also struggling with a growing budget deficit. Government spending outstripped income by MD23.6bn during the first six months of 2012, according to the Finance Ministry, compared with a deficit of MD4.2bn during the same period of 2011.

The cost of public sector wages rose 13.4 per cent, while the cost of subsidies increased 57.5 per cent. How the PJD and its partners plan to square plans for public spending on social services with an unsustainable budget deficit remains unclear.

Cutting government jobs is more or less a political impossibility as long as unemployment, currently above 9 per cent, remains high. With economic growth at 4.5 per cent in 2011 and 4.1 per cent in 2012, making a significant dent in unemployment will be tough.

Burden of expectation from Moroccan people

The PJD does not just have to cope with economic problems. As a party that had never taken part in government before, but now has more power than any of its predecessors, there is a weight of expectations on Benkirane and his party that it will solve ills of all kinds over a short period of time.

“Of course, expectations have been high,” says Lachen Haddad, tourism minister and an MP with the Popular Movement party, who previously worked in the US as an academic and development expert. “There were people who wanted a parliamentary system, people who wanted a socialist system. When you have a revolution, it leaves a lot of people disappointed. What is important is that everybody gets a bit of what has happened and that you have a majority who are happy.”

But not everyone is happy. A founder member of Morocco’s 20 February protest movement, which precipitated the constitutional changes of 2011, joined a group of graduates who had gathered in front of the House of Representatives, the country’s parliament in early August. Wearing high visibility vests adorned with the slogan “Dignity = Job”, they clamored for the government to provide them work.

The activist described the previous year’s protest movement as an unfinished revolution, claiming that “the regime” of King Mohamed VI and his inner circle, had little intention of fulfilling promises made. The new constitution was the work of a desperate leader, she said, echoing the sentiments of other activists who spoke to MEED, while the PJD were all too keen to strike a deal with the king.

The 20 February movement started out as a broad coalition and has become significantly smaller since the king announced plans for a new constitution and elections were held, concedes another activist.

It continues to protest human rights abuses, the economic power of the king’s inner circle, known as the Makhzen, and the power of the king himself. By accepting the king’s invitation to form a government, Benkirane effectively legitimised the constitutional changes, which ceded little real power, activists say.

“He [Benkirane] is the real cause of stagnation,” the 20 February founder says.

Other activists complain that although protests were allowed in 2011 and few of their number were arrested or put in jail, the police and the Moroccan secret police have been cracking down this year. “The regime is going crazy now,” says an official at a Rabat-headquartered human rights organisation. “When things were going well with the protest movement, they were careful. But now, they have decided to strike back.”

He points to the case of Mouad Belghouat, a Moroccan rap musician, who was sentenced to a year in prison in May after months of detention. Belghouat was not sentenced on the basis of his anti-monarchy lyrics, but rather because of a YouTube video for one of his songs which depicts policemen as donkeys. A friend is adamant that he had nothing to do with the making of the video. “This is how they are getting us,” he says. “By charging us with other things.”

Activists do not blame the PJD for the crackdown. Rather, they say, Benkirane is an unwitting buffer between the king and the people.

“I think the PJD are still unaware that the situation is unbearable,” says Fouad Abdelmoummi, a Moroccan economist, who was jailed by the current king’s father, Hassan II, for his political activism.

“The PJD knew that when they got recognition and were asked to form a coalition government, the palace was in such a bad situation that [the regime] would pay a crazy political price. The PJD is not radical – they are real monarchists. They are quite naive in economic and strategic matters. When you ask politicians what could be changed, they don’t know.”

Benkirane’s popularity in Morocco

Meanwhile, a Moroccan businessman with close ties to the government worries that not only is the PJD being used, but that Benkirane’s popularity is also a problem.

“They are jealous,” he says of the king’s inner circle. “They had to pay the price to remain in control, but now that he is on the front pages of the papers and magazines they don’t want Benkirane to be a success so they will work against him.”

Diplomats concede that infighting among the coalition government is an issue, and many politicians in Rabat are unsure that the coalition will last its full five-year term. Such machinations will only serve to divide opinion in Morocco.