Improved security, political stability and stronger oil revenues have brought Iraq back into investor conversations in recent years. Higher oil prices restored state finances, revived public spending and reinforced the narrative that Iraq was once again open for business. Relative calm strengthened that sentiment among regional and international firms.

Yet Iraq’s investment narrative has improved faster than its operating reality. A common mistake among foreign investors has been to view operations in Iraq primarily through the lens of security. While physical security remains important – particularly in the current regional climate – some of the most persistent risks are structural. These include opaque counterparties with hidden political backing, fragmented authority and overlapping power centres, exposure to sanctions-linked networks, and weak and often corrupt law enforcement and judicial institutions.

For most firms, the real test begins after market entry: when choosing a partner, bidding for contracts, moving funds, securing government approvals or attempting to enforce a contract or court judgment.

The current conflict has not changed these risks; rather, it has made them harder to ignore.

Basic due diligence and document checks are often insufficient to mitigate risks in a market as complex as Iraq

Counterparty risks and how to mitigate them

For many foreign investors operating in Iraq, one of the most significant risks lies in dealing with local counterparties – business partners, contractors, suppliers, clients and customers. Companies may appear conventional on paper, but ownership and control are often obscured through proxies.

One challenge is identifying who ultimately controls or benefits from a business and whether it has links to politically exposed persons, armed groups or sanctioned networks. Another is examining its business practices for signs of corruption or other illicit activity.

Every so often, we encounter seemingly well-established and reputable Iraqi business groups with extensive foreign partnerships that, following in-depth investigation, appear to be ultimately controlled by or linked to politicians, militia leaders, sanctioned individuals or Iran-aligned armed groups. Such connections often indicate a history of corrupt practices, ranging from bribery and the use of high-placed connections to secure government contracts to involvement in sophisticated money-laundering schemes or smuggling and diversion operations benefiting the Iranian state.

Foreign firms engaging with local counterparties may enter what appears to be a routine commercial arrangement, only to discover later that they are doing business with a highly sensitive or controversial political actor. The consequences extend beyond commercial risk. Regulatory, legal and reputational repercussions can follow, particularly where sanctions or criminal exposure exists.

Basic due diligence and document checks are often insufficient to mitigate risks in a market as complex as Iraq. Obtaining a deeper understanding of a potential counterparty’s ownership, control and track record is often constrained by the limited availability of credible information.

One of Iraq’s paradoxes is that it is not a data-poor jurisdiction. It generates abundant media reporting, leaks and social-media narratives. The challenge lies in judging what information matters, who is driving it, and what is missing.

The government also maintains a publicly accessible corporate register – Tasjeel – which contains basic information on the ownership of Iraq-registered private companies. The details, however, can be incomplete or out of date, and names on official filings often do not reflect actual control. There is also a notable lack of transparency when it comes to legal searches in Iraq: neither criminal nor civil litigation records are publicly available.

The availability of information also varies across the country. Iraq is not a single commercial jurisdiction. In practice, overlapping and sometimes competing systems of authority exist, particularly between federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. Licensing, customs procedures, taxation, political sponsorship and legal recourse can differ significantly, as can the accessibility of official records, with the Kurdistan Region generally offering less transparency.

For all these reasons, source-based enquiries remain central to any serious risk assessment in Iraq. Human intelligence gathered on the ground through a network of knowledgeable sources often fills critical information gaps, providing context and insights that cannot be obtained from public records alone.

The impact of regional war and political changes on structural weaknesses

The recent deterioration in the regional security environment has renewed attention on Iraq. Investors are once again weighing insurance costs, movement restrictions, supply-chain exposure and the risk of disruption from armed escalation.

The implications, however, extend well beyond immediate security concerns. Regional conflict often strengthens informal power structures, elevates the influence of armed factions, increases exposure to pro-Iran networks and complicates sanctions assessments. Institutions may slow decision‑making, while border friction, diversion risk and financial scrutiny intensify.

As a result, the risk categories familiar to foreign investors – political, compliance, legal and operational – often become intertwined in Iraq. A politically exposed counterparty can become a sanctions issue; a regulatory delay can turn political; and a commercial dispute may prove unenforceable where the other party operates within a stronger network of influence.

There is also a new variable in play. Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali Al-Zaidi, is a seasoned businessman with significant interests in banking, the food industry and other sectors. For foreign investors, this background may be viewed as a positive signal, suggesting a greater emphasis on deal-making, investor outreach and easing market entry. However, a businessman at the top can help only up to a point. Iraq’s core business risks are rooted in institutions, networks and entrenched political structures that even a pro‑business leader must navigate.

Counterparty risk assessment should sit at the centre of any market-entry strategy

What serious investors should do differently

None of this means Iraq should be written off. It remains a market with scale, unmet demand and clear areas of opportunity. But it does mean foreign companies need a more disciplined approach.

Counterparty risk assessment should sit at the centre of any market-entry strategy. That means identifying beneficial ownership, mapping political exposure, screening for sanctions links and understanding the broader network surrounding a local counterparty rather than relying solely on a basic corporate registry check.

Iraq should also be treated as a market that requires continuous monitoring, not one-off screening. Ownership, influence and compliance exposure can change quickly. A clean partner at onboarding is not guaranteed to remain a low risk a year later.

About the authors

Dr Anastasia Nosova is associate managing director at K2 Integrity, a prominent global risk advisory, compliance and corporate investigations firm. Renwar Ahmed is an associate at the company’s Investigations & Disputes practice. 

MEED’s June 2026 report on Iraq includes:

> COMMENT: Iraq’s reform window narrows
> GOVERNMENT: Al-Zaidi takes Iraq’s premiership under US shadow
> BANKING: Financial challenge tests Iraq’s resolve
> ECONOMY: Iraq enters era of resilience, reform and rising risks 
> OIL & GAS: Iraqi oil and gas sector in crisis
> POWER & WATER: Focus shifts to delivery of Iraq utilities expansion
> CONSTRUCTION: Momentum builds in Iraq’s post-war construction sector